Abstract-Consider two parties holding samples from correlated distributions W and W 0 , respectively, where these samples are within distance t of each other in some metric space. The parties wish to agree on a close-to-uniformly distributed secret key R by sending a single message over an insecure channel controlled by an all-powerful adversary who may read and modify anything sent over the channel. We consider both the keyless case, where the parties share no additional secret information, and the keyed case, where the parties share a long-term secret that they can use to generate a sequence of session keys fR j g using multiple pairs f(Wj; W 0 j )g. The former has applications to, e.g., biometric authentication, while the latter arises in, e.g., the bounded-storage model with errors. We show solutions that improve upon previous work in several respects.
variables communicate in order to generate a shared, secret, close-to-uniform key . The problem has variously been called "information reconciliation" (especially when the challenge is to handle differences between the samples held by the parties), "privacy amplification" (especially in the case when and the goal is to transform a nonuniform shared secret to a uniform one), or "fuzzy extraction." Early work [3] , [5] , [26] , [43] assumed the parties could communicate over a public but authenticated channel or, equivalently, assumed a passive adversary. This assumption was relaxed in later work [27] , [29] , [30] , [33] , [42] , which considered an active adversary who could modify all messages sent between the two parties.
The goal of the aforementioned works was primarily to explore the possibility of information-theoretic security, especially in the context of quantum cryptography; however, this is not the only motivation. The problem also arises in the context of using noisy data (such as biometric information, or observations of some physical phenomenon) for cryptographic purposes, even if computational security suffices. The same problem also arises in the context of the bounded-storage model(untrusted) server acting as the "communication channel" between these two instances of the user. This second scenario inherently requires a noninteractive (i.e., one-message) solution since is no longer available at the later point in time. Note also that any solution for the second scenario also provides a solution for the first.
Several protocols for key agreement using noisy data over an authenticated channel are known [3] , [5] , [16] , [20] , [22] . Most of the existing work for an unauthenticated channel, however, solves the problem only for two special cases [27] , [29] , [30] , [33] , [42] : 1) when , or (2) when and consist of (arbitrarily many) independent realizations of the same random variable, i.e., and . In the case of biometric data, however,
are not likely to be equal and we cannot, in general, obtain an unbounded number of samples.
Recently, there has been progress on the general case. Renner and Wolf [34] were the first to demonstrate that an interactive solution is possible. Their protocol was not efficient, but an efficient version was later given [24] . Boyen [8] showed (in the random oracle model) how to achieve unidirectional authentication, as well as a weak form of security for the second scenario (roughly, remains secret but the user can be fooled into using an incorrect key ). Boyen et al. [9] showed two solutions to the problem. Their first solution is noninteractive and thus applies to both aforementioned scenarios, but relies on random oracles. Their second solution is interactive, and relies on password-based key exchange as a primitive. This means that it provides computational rather than information-theoretic security; furthermore, given the current state-of-the-art for password-based key exchange, their solution is impractical without additional assumptions such as random oracles or the existence of public parameters.
B. BSM and the Keyed Case
Key agreement using correlated information arises also in the context of the BSM [28] in the presence of errors [14] , [17] . In the BSM, two parties share a long-term secret key . In each time period , a long random string is broadcast to the parties (and the adversary); the assumption is that the length of is more than what the adversary can store. The parties use and to generate a secret session key in each period. This process should achieve "everlasting security" [1] , meaning that even if is revealed to the adversary in some time period , all session keys remain independently and uniformly distributed from the perspective of the adversary.
A paradigm (formalized by [39] ) for achieving the above is for to contain a seed for a sampler 1 and another seed for a randomness extractor. The parties use to sample some portion of in each period; in the absence of errors, this results in each party holding the same value . Since the adversary may have some partial information about , however, this shared value is not uniformly distributed from the point of view of the adversary, and the parties must therefore use a randomness extractor with the seed to gen-erate a uniform key for the current period. In the presence of transmission errors in , the problem is even more difficult, as the parties then hold correlated (but possibly unequal) strings after the initial sampling. The parallels to biometric authentication should be clear. Nevertheless, the problems are incomparable: in the case of the BSM with errors, there is a stronger setup assumption (namely, that the parties share a long-term key ) but the security requirements are more stringent since needs to be reusable and everlasting security is required.
C. Our Contributions
We focus on the abstract problem of secret-key agreement between two parties holding instances of correlated random variables that are guaranteed to be close but not necessarily identical. Specifically, we assume that and are within distance in some underlying metric space. Our definitions as well as some of our results hold for arbitrary metric spaces, while other results assume specific metrics.
We restrict our attention to noninteractive protocols defined by procedures that operate as follows. The first party, holding , computes and sends to the second party; this second party computes . (If the parties share a long-term key , then take this key as additional input.) The basic requirements, informally, are the following.
Correctness: if is within distance of . Security: If the min-entropy of is high, then is uniformly distributed even given . So far, this gives exactly a fuzzy extractor as defined by Dodis et al. [16] (although we additionally allow the possibility of a long-term key). Since we are interested in the case when the parties communicate over an unauthenticated channel, however, we actually want to construct robust fuzzy extractors [9] that additionally protect against malicious modification of . Robustness requires that if the adversary sends any modified value , then with high probability, the second player will reject (i.e., ). We distinguish between the notion of preapplication robustness and the stronger notion of postapplication robustness, where in the latter case, the adversary is given before it generates . Postapplication robustness is needed in settings where the first party may begin using before the second party computes , and is also needed for the "key recovery" scenario discussed earlier (since previous usage of may leak information about it).
We now summarize our results.
The case of no errors: Although our focus is on the case when are unequal, we obtain improvements also in the case when they are equal (i.e., ) but nonuniform. Let denote the min-entropy of and let denote its bit length. The best previous noninteractive solution in this setting is due to Maurer and Wolf [27] who show that when , it is possible to achieve preapplication robustness and generate a shared key of length . On the other hand, results in [18] and [19] imply that a noninteractive solution is impossible when . (As shown in [27, Sec. III-C], interactive solutions can do better; in fact, it is possible for the length of to be nearly [11] , [19] , [33] .)
We bridge the gap between known upper and lower bounds and show that whenever , it is possible to achieve preapplication robustness and generate a shared key of length . This improves both the required min-entropy of and the length of the resulting key. Moreover, we give the first solution satisfying postapplication robustness. That solution also works as long as , but extracts a key half as long (i.e., of length ).
Handling errors:
The only previously known construction of robust fuzzy extractors [9] relies on the random oracle model. We (partially) resolve the main open question in [9] by showing a construction of robust fuzzy extractors in the standard model for the specific cases of the Hamming and set-difference metrics. 2 (The solution in [9] is generic and applies to any metric admitting a good error-correcting code.) Our construction achieves postapplication robustness.
The techniques of this paper were subsequently generalized in [12] .
Using a shared long-term key: There are scenarios in which the two parties trying to derive from and already share a long-term secret key. Motivated by such settings, we define and construct a keyed robust fuzzy extractor for general metrics. In the process, we introduce a new primitive called an extractor message authentication code (MAC): a one-time information-theoretic message authentication code whose output is independent of the key if the message has sufficient entropy.
Application to the BSM with errors: Prior work focusing on the BSM with errors [14] , [17] showed a noninteractive (i.e., single-message) solution to the problem discussed in Section I-B when the samples of the parties have constant relative Hamming distance. The solution of [14] is stateful: the long-term key is updated by both parties after each time period using information derived from . If a party misses a time period and is no longer synchronized with the other party, it is not clear how to recover. The solution in [17] is stateless; the parties keep the same long-term key and can communicate even if one of them misses some . However, this solution assumes that the parties can communicate over an authenticated channel. Building on keyed robust fuzzy extractors, we show a stateless solution for the BSM with errors (under the Hamming metric) using an unauthenticated channel.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
For strings and , we use to denote their concatenation and let denote the length of . If is a set, means that is chosen uniformly from . If is a probability distribution, then means that is chosen according to . The notation denotes the probability assigned by to the value . (We often omit the subscript when the probability distribution is clear from context.) If is a probabilistic algorithm and is an input, denotes the output of running with random coins , and is the random variable for uniformly sampled . If is a distribution, then is the random variable obtained by sampling and then running . We let denote the uniform distribution over . All logarithms are base 2. Let be two probability distributions over some set . Their statistical distance is . If two distributions have statistical distance at most , we say they are -close and write . Note that -close distributions cannot be distinguished with advantage better than by an adversary who gets a single sample, even if the adversary is computationally unbounded.
The min-entropy of a random variable is defined as . Following [16] , we define the (average) conditional min-entropy of given as (where the expectation is over for which is nonzero). This definition is suited for cryptographic purposes because the probability that an adversary can predict when given the value of is . 
A. Hash Functions and Extractors
We recall the notion of almost-universal hashing [10] , [36] . [31] yield a (close to) uniform string from a random variable with high min-entropy, using a uniform seed . Strong extractors guarantee that the extracted string is uniform even conditioned on the seed. We consider only strong extractors in this paper, and thus often omit the qualifier "strong."
Definition 2: Let be a set and the uniform distribution over that set. A function is a -if for all distributions over with , we have . We refer to the second argument to as the seed. We need to strengthen the aforementioned definition to account for external information an adversary knows that may be correlated with . To do so, we generalize the min-entropy constraint on to average min-entropy, and require the extracted string to be uniform even given . Namely , and a tag , and outputs either 1 or 0, with the former being interpreted as acceptance and the latter as rejection. Correctness requires that for all and all , we have . Security requires that when is chosen uniformly, an unbounded adversary cannot output a valid tag on a new message even after being given the tag on any message of its choice. Formally, see the following definition.
Definition 3:
Message authentication code is aif for any adversary and any message , the probability that the following experiment outputs "success" is at most : Choose uniform key ; let ; let ; output "success" if and . We next recall the notion of (almost) strongly universal hashing [36] , [41] . as the high-order bits of . An almost strongly universal hash family can be used for information-theoretic authentication of a message using a secret key , by letting the tag be . The property of being -almost strongly universal implies that this is a -secure one-time MAC.
C. Secure Sketches and Fuzzy Extractors
We review the definitions of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors from [16] . Let be a metric space with distance function . Informally, a secure sketch enables recovery of a string from any "close" string , without leaking too much information about . For the case of the Hamming metric on , we will make use of the syndrome construction from [16] (this construction also appeared as a component of earlier work, e.g., [4] ). Here, the sketch consists of the -bit syndrome 3 of with respect to some (efficiently decodable) -error-correcting code. We do not need any details of this construction other than the facts that is a (deterministic) linear function of and that the entropy loss is at most . We also note that this construction can be extended to the set-difference metric [16] .
As opposed to a secure sketch, whose goal is to recover the original input, a fuzzy extractor enables generation of a close-touniform string from , and subsequent reproduction of from any close to . In this study, we will also use keyed fuzzy extractors where both and use the same key , which is uniform and independent of the input distribution . Here, we require the additional security property that are independently uniform conditioned on . This stronger requirement stems from the fact that needs to be reusable; thus, it should remain uniform and independent of in order to be useful next time. This requirement implies (by a hybrid argument) that keyed fuzzy extractors can be used multiple times (with the same key ) to extract independent keys from independent . It also implies that any extracted key remains uniform even to an adversary who learns and (but not ). , and , then . For some applications, we need to impose the additional condition that, informally, not reveal any information about the distribution . Formally, the distribution should be the same regardless of the distribution , as long as has sufficient min-entropy. It is easiest, though slightly more restrictive than necessary, to simply require to be uniform (for any with sufficient min-entropy). That is, we say that has if the security condition is strengthened to require . This additional security condition was subsequently explored in the setting of interactive key agreement [7] .
This additional requirement may seem strange: after all, security of a fuzzy extractor depends not on secrecy of the distribution , but only on the fact that has high min-entropy, which ensures that the specific sample is secret. However, there are applications that need the distribution to be kept secret, and the public output of the fuzzy extractor can harm them if this requirement is not satisfied.
The specific application considered in this paper is to the BSM (introduced in Section I-B and addressed in detail in Section IV-C). In this application, the input distribution to the fuzzy extractor depends on the sampling seed , which needs to remain secret so that it can be reused.
D. Robust Fuzzy Extractors
Fuzzy extractors protect against a passive attack in which an adversary observes and tries to learn something about the extracted key . However, the definition says nothing about what happens if an adversary can modify as it is sent to the user holding . That is, there are no guarantees about the output of for . Boyen et al. [9] propose the notion of robust fuzzy extractors, which provide strong guarantees against such an attack. Specifically, can now output either a key or a special value (denoting "fail"). The definition requires that with high probability, any value produced by the adversary (after being given ) causes to output . Modified versions of the public information will therefore be detected.
We consider two variants of this idea, depending on whether and additionally share a long-term key . (Boyen et al. considered only the keyless version.) Furthermore, we distinguish between two adversarial attacks, and thus two notions of robustness, depending on whether the adversary has access to when modifying . Indeed, if is used (e.g., for encryption) and the adversary can observe some effect of this use (e.g., the ciphertext) before modifying , then the notion of robustness from Boyen et al. (in which the adversary is given no information about ) is insufficient. Our stronger notion accounts for this by giving the adversary access to in addition to . This is a conservative choice that results in a broadly applicable definition: security holds regardless of how is used and whether it remains hidden partially, computationally, or not at all. We call this stronger notion postapplication robustness, and refer to the original notion (where is not given to the adversary) as preapplication robustness. Preapplication robustness suffices if the adversary's ability to modify ends prior to any observable use of .
If are two (correlated) random variables over a metric space , we say if the distance between and is at most with probability one. We call a -pair if and .
Definition 8:
An -fuzzy extractor has if for all -pairs and all adversaries , the probability that the following experiment outputs "success" is at most : Sample from ; let ; let (resp., ); output "success" if and . The definition is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Note that the definition is interesting even when (i.e., when ), because ordinary extractors are not usually robust. We construct (keyless) robust fuzzy extractors in Section III, and keyed robust fuzzy extractors in Section IV.
The definition of robust extractors composes with itself in some situations. For example, a generalization of the above (used in [9] ) allows the adversary to output ; the adversary succeeds if there exists an with .
A simple union bound shows that the success probability of an adversary in this case increases at most linearly in . Similarly, suppose two players (Alice and Bob) receive a sequence of pairs of random variables (with Alice receiving the and Bob receiving the ), such that for all , and the entropy of conditioned on the information from prior time periods is at least . Alice and Bob can agree on random and independent keys by having Alice apply from a robust average-case fuzzy extractor to each and then send to Bob. The attacker's advantage in distinguishing the vector of unknown keys from random is at most (this follows by a hybrid argument that replaces extracted keys by random strings one a time, starting with the most recent one). The attacker's probability of forging a valid is at most in any given period (this can be shown by simply giving the attacker ); thus, the overall probability of forgery over all time periods is at most .
For keyed fuzzy extractors, robustness is defined exactly as in Definition 8 with the only difference being that and both use the same (uniform) key (which is not given to the adversary); see Fig. 1 . At first glance, the addition of a long-term key may seem to trivialize the problem of constructing robust fuzzy extractors. For example, one might attempt to use as a key for a message authentication code and, given output from a fuzzy extractor, simply append to the tag . While this may work in the computational setting, it will not suffice in the information-theoretic setting if we want to support an unbounded number of time periods (or if we want to use a key whose length does not grow linearly in the number of time periods supported). Furthermore, such a construction will not satisfy the security property of Definition 7 because will not be uniform conditioned on and .
III. CONSTRUCTING (KEYLESS) ROBUST FUZZY EXTRACTORS
We begin by analyzing the case of no errors (i.e., ), and then consider the more general case.
A. Errorless Case
Consider the case where and Alice and Bob hold the same sample of a random variable . In the presence of a passive adversary, Alice and Bob can agree on a uniform key using a strong extractor . Phrased using the terminology of fuzzy extractors (with here), Alice runs which simply samples a seed for , and sends to Bob; both Alice and Bob then output the key . This solution does not work if the adversary is active, which is why robust fuzzy extractors are interesting even in the errorless case. In particular, if an adversary forwards to Bob, then there is no longer any guarantee on Bob's output ; in fact, it is easy to show a construction of a strong extractor with the property that a maliciously generated completely determines Bob's key . One idea to address this is for Alice to authenticate using the key she extracts, and then send the authentication tag along with to Bob. In general, this does not work either: if the adversary forwards to Bob, then it may be easy for the adversary to generate a forged tag with respect to the key that Bob derives. Instead, we use itself to authenticate and show that this approach works for a particular choice of strong extractor and message authentication code.
We define algorithms as follows. To compute , parse as two strings and of lengths and , respectively, where is a parameter of the construction. View as an element of and as an element of (the representation of field elements does not matter, as long as addition in the field corresponds to exclusive-or of bit strings). This is equivalent to , where " " denotes concatenation (this is because we insisted that addition/subtraction in the finite fields corresponds to bitwise exclusive-or). If , then we must have and so the probability is 0. If , then there is a unique that satisfies the equality. Thus, the probability is at most . Using the above and the leftover hash lemma (Lemma 2), we see that is -close to or, put differently, that . This implies using the triangle inequality. Preapplication robustness: We prove the stronger result that robustness holds for worst case choice of . Fix and , and let be the event that succeeds. Since is unbounded, we may assume it is deterministic. Upon observing , the adversary outputs . If , then will reject unless ; therefore, we need only consider the case . By definition, succeeds only if . Call a triple a transcript, and say it is possible if . For any possible transcript , the following holds (in the following probability expressions, are chosen according to the distribution conditioned on or, equivalently, conditioned on ) where the final equality holds because we insisted that addition/ subtraction in our fields corresponds to bitwise exclusive-or. The term takes on each possible value in exactly once as varies; therefore, there are values of for which . For each such value of , there is a unique value of that satisfies . Each pair occurs with probability at most . Thus
The overall success probability of is given by Since , we have and we conclude that . Postapplication robustness: Because , providing to the adversary can increase its success probability by a multiplicative factor of at most as compared to preapplication robustness. 4 Thus, if , the adversary's success probability (in the postapplication robustness game) is at most .
B. Improved Postapplication Robustness for the Errorless Case
In this section, we present a construction of an extractor with postapplication robustness that extracts a key of length , an improvement by a factor of as compared to the construction given previously.
Assume is even for simplicity. To compute , let and denote the first and last halves of , respectively, and view and as elements of . Choose a random and compute . Let be the first bits of , where is a parameter of the scheme, and let be the remainder of ; i.e., and Output . , where , proceeds in the obvious way: parse as two strings as earlier. Then, verify that and output if this is not the case. Otherwise, compute the extracted key . Before giving the formal proof, we provide some intuition as to why this construction has better postapplication robustness. Recall that in the previous construction, is parsed as two strings and of lengths and , respectively, and the values are computed as and . Increasing improves robustness but decreases the number of extracted bits. For preapplication robustness, setting suffices, and thus, the construction extracts nearly bits. For postapplication robustness, however, a larger must be used and consequently the number of extracted bits is decreased.
The postapplication robustness game reveals more information to the adversary about than the preapplication robustness game. This additional information-namely, itself-may make it easier for to guess . The key to our improvement is to use the pairwise-independent function to compute both and . Because of pairwise independence, the value of leaks nothing about the value for any . (This holds when is uniform; when has min-entropy , then may have up to bits of information about .) In contrast, in the previous construction, only was computed using a pairwise-independent hash function. This works better for preapplication robustness (because can be taken shorter), but worse for postapplication robustness. The overall success probability of is given by Since , we have and so .
C. Authenticating a Message While Extracting
Each of the constructions given previously uses the parties' input to authenticate the extractor seed . Each construction can be extended to additionally authenticate a message , i.e., to be simultaneously a robust fuzzy extractor and an information-theoretic one-time MAC. In this setting, both and will take an additional input , and it should be difficult for an adversary to cause to accept a different . (We are being informal here since this is merely a stepping stone to the results in the following section.) This could be done naively by using (a part of) as a key for a MAC, but this would correspondingly reduce the final number of extracted bits. In contrast, the approach presented here (almost) does not reduce the length of at all. We show how to extend the original construction given at the beginning of Section III-A; the construction of Section III-B can be extended similarly. We adapt a standard technique [6] , [13] , [38] for authenticating messages using polynomial-based almost-universal hash functions. Let , where is known to both parties in advance. Split into chunks , each bits long, and view these as coefficients of a polynomial of degree . To compute , parse as , choose random , compute , and set . As earlier, the extracted key is . The procedure , given , , and , verifies that and that . If so, it accepts as valid and additionally outputs . Extraction and robustness (which here means that neither nor can be modified without detection) are proved in a manner very similar to the proof of Theorem 3. Fix arbitrary , known to the adversary. To argue that is nearly uniform given , we will show that is universal. Indeed, for , we have If , then and the aforementioned equality cannot be satisfied; if , there is a unique satisfying the equality. This proves universality. The rest of the proof proceeds as earlier.
For (preapplication) robustness, fix arbitrary and (known to ) and proceed as earlier. The only difference is that we now need to compute the number of values of for which (1) The crucial property is that the polynomial is nonconstant if . A nonconstant polynomial of degree at most can take on a given value at most times; hence, there are at most values of satisfying (1) . The probability that the adversary succeeds (in changing either or without being detected) is thus at most . Note that the resulting forgery probability is affected only by a multiplicative factor of ; since we expect in practice, the impact is small.
D. Adding Error Tolerance
We now consider settings when the input held by the second party is close, but not identical to the input used by the first party. An obvious first attempt is to include a secure sketch along with , and to authenticate using the message-authentication technique discussed in the previous section; would allow recovery of from , and then verification could proceed as earlier. Unfortunately, this does not quite work: if the adversary modifies the sketch , then a different value may be recovered; however, the results of the previous section apply only when the receiver uses the same as the sender. In effect, we have a circularity: the receiver uses to verify that was not modified, but the receiver computes (from ) using a possibly modified .
We show how to break this circularity using a modification of the message-authentication technique from earlier. The key idea is to exploit algebraic structure in the metric space, and to change the message authentication code so that it remains secure even when the adversary can influence the key (this is sometimes referred to as "security against related-key attacks"; our approach was generalized in [12] ). Specifically, we first treat the case where the distance between and is small in the Hamming metric; in Section III-G, we extend the approach to the set-difference metric.
Another problem arises from the fact that the performance of our previous constructions degrades not only when the min-entropy of the input decreases, but also when the entropy gap increases (for example, Theorem 3 can extract roughly bits with preapplication robustness). Because reveals information about , the entropy of from the adversary's point of view decreases, and the entropy gap increases. An important idea is to limit this increase by using the (shorter) part of that is independent of .
E. Tolerating Binary Hamming Errors
We begin by extending the construction presented at the beginning of Section III-A to tolerate binary hamming errors; we then extend the construction from Section III-B.
Our metric space is and the distance between two strings is Hamming distance-i.e., the number of bit positions in which they differ. Suppose the input is a distribution of min-entropy over , and that is guaranteed to be within distance of . Our starting point is to use a deterministic, linear, secure sketch that is bits long; let and note that . We assume that is a surjective, linear function (this is the case for the syndrome sketch for the Hamming metric), and so there exists a matrix of rank such that . Let be an matrix such that the matrix has full rank. We let . One can view as the information remaining in once has been learned by the adversary.
We Check that : if not, output ; otherwise, output . Before turning to the detailed analysis, we note that the polynomial defined previously differs from the message-authentication technique in the previous section only in the leading term (and the forcing of to be even). It has the property that for any pair , and for any fixed offset , the polynomial is a nonconstant polynomial of degree at most : this is easy to see for ; if , then the leading term is (recall we are working in a field of characteristic 2 and is even). Our analysis will show that amounts to a message authentication code (where the shared key is used to authenticate ) that is provably secure against a class of related-key attacks where the adversary can force the receiver to use a key shifted by an offset known to the adversary. 5 Before giving the proof, we briefly discuss the parameters obtained. The bound on differs in two main terms from the bound in the errorless case of Theorem 3. First, we lose the length of the sketch. This is not surprising, since the sketch may reduce the min-entropy of by up to bits. Second, we 5 Note B = 1 +
. The second bound is achieved by noting that every point in the ball centered at 0 can be represented by up to t strings of length log(n + 1) each, where each string represents the position of a 1 or
indicates "the end" in case the weight of a point is less than t.
lose another additive factor of . In general, this is (to some extent) inherent, since the min-entropy of may be as low as . Looking at it slightly differently, in our analysis, we start by giving the attacker "for free," which can reduce the min-entropy of by . We can prove a generalization of the aforementioned result where the term is replaced by . Thus, for example, if errors are independent of , then the term is no longer present.
Proof: That the construction satisfies the functionality of a robust fuzzy extractor is clear, we thus turn to proving security. The argument that is nearly uniform given is similar to the errorless case, except that the entropy loss due to the sketch has to be taken into account. For every , the family is universal because for every , there is at most one such that . Since , applying Lemma 2 and proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3 gives . , which is nonzero since is even and we are working in a field of characteristic 2.) Thus, for any , the number of values of for which is at most , and so the number of values of that satisfy is at most . Each such value occurs with probability at most (where we let also stand for the random variable describing the distribution of ), giving the bound . Note that because ; finally since . This completes the proof of (2). We may now easily prove the theorem. We have using (2). Since , Lemma 1 gives
Observe that (because ). We conclude that the success probability of is at most Postapplication robustness: Because the extracted key is of length , providing it to the adversary can increase its success probability by at most a factor of . The rest of the analysis remains the same.
F. Improved Postapplication Robustness for the Hamming Metric
In this section, we extend the construction from Section III-B to tolerate binary Hamming errors. The space is still with Hamming distance.
is similar to the one in the previous construction except that now and are obtained by splitting into two equal parts (we assume for simplicity that is even) and computing and .
Theorem 6:
Let denote under the Hamming metric, let be the -secure syndrome sketch for , and let denote the volume of the ball of radius in . Fix , and let be the length of the extracted key. Then, for any satisfying is a -fuzzy extractor for with postapplication robustness .
Proof: We first show that is nearly uniform given . For every , the family is universal. Since , applying the Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma 2) and proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3 shows that . Postapplication robustness: We prove the stronger result that robustness holds for worst case choice of , and even if the adversary is given . Fix and , and let be the event that succeeds. Since is unbounded, we may assume it is deterministic. Upon observing , the adversary outputs . If , then will reject unless ; thus, we need only consider the case . Call a tuple a transcript and denote it by . Call a transcript feasible if . For some fixed feasible transcript, the adversary's success depends only on choice of (conditioned on the given values of ). As in the proof of Theorem 5, for any feasible transcript, there is at most one value for each of for which will not reject, and moreover, the values and can be computed by . Following an argument exactly as in the proof of that theorem, for any feasible transcript , we have and so Since , we obtain .
G. Construction for the Set-Difference Metric
The constructions from the previous two sections rely heavily on the linearity of the secure sketch used in the protocol and on the structure of the Hamming space. Using the techniques from [16] , however, they can be extended to handle errors under the set-difference metric.
In the set-difference metric, elements of are sets of at most elements chosen from some fixed universe of size ; the distance between two sets is the size of their symmetric difference:
. Noting that elements of can be represented by characteristic vectors of length , we see that the set-difference metric is equivalent to the Hamming metric; this is inefficient, however, since elements of can be represented using at most bits. Algorithms here should, ideally, run in time rather than in time . In order to extend the analysis of the previous sections to handle this different representation of the input, we need a pair of functions that take sets and output strings of length and , respectively. A set of size at most should be uniquely determined by the pair , and the functions should be linear in the following sense: the addition/removal of a particular element should correspond to adding/subtracting a particular bit vector. In other words, and should be linear in the characteristic vector of their input set. The function of the BCH secure sketch of Dodis et al. [16, Sec. 6 .3] (called "PinSketch") is, in fact, linear: it outputs values of bits each in order to correct up to errors, thus producing sketches of length . We will see in a moment how to construct corresponding to this . For the PinSketch construction, the universe must be viewed as nonzero elements of a binary field for some and thus . The constructions of and are the same as in the previous sections, but using different , , and functions. In addition, should check that the recovered value is a set with elements in . (Note, however, that it is not necessary to check that has size at most ; the constructions work correctly even if has more than elements, so long as .) The analysis is the same as in the previous sections. The volume of the ball of radius remains the same as in the binary Hamming case; here, is very large compared to and so we use in our formulas since this is now a close approximation. Using and , we obtain the following as corollaries of Theorems 5 and 6, respectively.
Corollary 7:
Let be the set-difference metric on sets of size at most over the universe . Using from Section III-E with as described previously, fix and then let be the length of the extracted key. Then: 1) For any satisfying is an -fuzzy extractor for with preapplication robustness . 2) For any satisfying is an -fuzzy extractor for with postapplication robustness .
Corollary 8:
Let be the set-difference metric on sets of size at most over the universe . Using from Section III-F with as described previously, fix and then let be the length of the extracted key. Then, for any satisfying is a -fuzzy extractor for with postapplication robustness .
It remains to describe . For self-containment, we include a description of as well. To compute and on input , let (computations in ) and, viewing values as bit strings, output and . Given any set of points, these two vectors are easy to compute in operations in . Moreover, given , one can recover . (Simply observe that is the syndrome of the characteristic vector of with respect to the binary BCH code of distance , and that the weight of this vector is at most . See [16, Lemma 6.2], setting , , and .) Algorithms have the desired linearity property since adding or removing an element from corresponds to adding to each component (and we require addition in binary fields to correspond to bitwise exclusive-or).
IV. KEYED ROBUST FUZZY EXTRACTORS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
In this section, we show that the addition of a very short, long-term, shared secret key allows us to achieve considerably better parameters when constructing keyed robust fuzzy extractors. The parameters we obtain are optimal up to constant factors.
To motivate our construction, recall the naive transformation from fuzzy extractors to keyed robust fuzzy extractors discussed in Section II-E. Suppose we start from the generic construction of a fuzzy extractor from [16, Lemma 4.1]: here, , where for a secure sketch , and the extracted key is . In an attempt to make this construction robust, we may set and include as part of . This is fine for one-time use, but leaks information about so cannot be used an unbounded number of times. Formally, this construction does not satisfy Definition 7 since is not uniform given .
We can change the scheme to avoid this. Note that must recover before computing . Thus, we can add to the authenticated message, i.e., set . The tag can be verified by after recovering . This does not strengthen the robustness property, which was already satisfied by the original scheme. However, it does help with the problem of revealing , since now the attacker does not know the entire message being authenticated, so the entropy of the message can be used to hide . Thus, we see that we need to construct an information-theoretic MAC whose secret key is independent of the tag as long as the authenticated message has high min-entropy. Observe that in strong randomness extractors, the output is independent of the seed. Thus, it suffices to ensure that is simultaneously a message authentication code and a strong randomness extractor when the key is viewed as the seed. (Note that we do not need the guarantee, provided by the extractor property, that the tag output by is itself uniform; nevertheless, uniform tags are easy enough to achieve.) This is the problem we turn to in the next section.
A. Extractor-MACs
Definition 9: A family of functions is a if it is -almost strongly universal and an (average-case) strong extractor.
When constructing MACs, one typically tries to minimize the tag length (to approach the bound ), while for extractors, one tries to maximize the output length (to approach the bound ). In our setting, the extractor constraint is merely a convenient way to argue key reuse, so we will in fact try to minimize . Naturally, we also want to minimize the min-entropy threshold .
Our construction of extractor-MACs follows from the observation that almost strongly-universal hash functions are MACs and, as universal hash functions, also extractors. (In fact, this observation was used to get extractors with short seeds in [35, Sec. 3] ). We exemplify our construction with the family constructed in [6, Sec. 4] . Specifically, we compose two hash families as follows. Let be a -almost universal hash family mapping -bit inputs to -bit outputs (for some to be determined later), and let be a strongly universal hash family mapping -bit inputs to -bit outputs, where (i.e., ). Set . By [36, Th. 5.5] , is a -almost strongly universal hash family, since . This means it can be used for message authentication. Furthermore, by [36, Th. 5.4] , it is -almost universal, since is -almost universal. By the Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma 2), this means it is an -extractor with . We will set to be the family from [36, Th. 5.2] (described following Definition 4) with keys of length . It remains to set so that we can construct a convenient almost-universal hash family . We use the polynomial-based construction from [6] , [13] , and [38] . The key is a point in , and the message is split into pieces , each of which is viewed as an element of . Then, . This family is -almost universal with key length (because two distinct degreepolynomials agree on at most points). We can set to make . This gives key length , and we obtain the following.
Theorem 9: For any
, and , there exists a -extractor-MAC for messages of length , with key length and tag length . This construction has both short keys and short tags. One can reuse the key as long as the min-entropy of the authenticated message is above the threshold . The tag length is within one bit of optimal, since it is impossible to obtain -almost strong universality with tags shorter than . Known bounds on extractors [32, Th. 1.9] (reinterpreted for strong extractors by viewing the seed as part of the extractor output) imply that the key length is optimal up to a constant factor and the entropy threshold is optimal up to an additive constant.
B. Constructing Keyed Robust Fuzzy Extractors
We now apply extractor-MACs to build keyed robust fuzzy extractors. We start with a generic construction and set the parameters in the following.
Assume is an -secure sketch with sketch length ;
is an average-case -extractor with -bit inputs, -bit outputs, and -bit seeds; and is an average-case -extractor-MAC from bits to bits having a key of length . We now define a keyed robust fuzzy extractor with secret key , which is simply the extractor-MAC secret key . 1)
: compute sketch , sample at random, set key , tag , and output . 2) : Let . If , then ; else .
Theorem 10:
The aforementioned construction is a -keyed fuzzy extractor with postapplication robustness , which uses a secret key of length and outputs public information of length . Proof: We need to show correctness, security, and unforgeability. Correctness follows immediately from the correctness of the secure sketch. To show security (i.e., extraction), we need to argue that for any of min-entropy , we have or equivalently Indeed because and is an average-case -extractor. This trivially implies that On the other hand because (the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the last inequality follows by independence of ), and is a average-case extractor.
By the triangle inequality, therefore, we obtain Using the triangle inequality again, we obtain the desired result.
To show robustness, suppose outputs . First, consider the case when . In this case, implies , and thus, . Therefore, unless and , will output . Now, consider the case when . Then, in order for not to reject, must correctly guess the tag of a new message with a uniformly chosen key , which cannot be done with probability higher than by the -almost strong universality of . Note that this implies postapplication robustness: it does not hurt to reveal (or even itself) to , because the security of relies on the secrecy of only.
The price of authentication:
We compare the parameters of Theorem 10 to the original (nonrobust, nonkeyed) constructions in [16] . First, note that the choice of a sketch and strong extractor can be done in the same manner as for nonrobust fuzzy extractors. Assume we use the construction of Theorem 9 for . Then, the secret key is just the MAC key, whose length is as long as and (which is the case with typical extractor and secure sketch constructions), so that . For the extractor-MAC of Theorem 9 to work, we need or . This means that the key is only bits shorter than for nonrobust extractors, which can extract bits [16, Lemma 4.3] . Finally, the length of increases only by the tag length .
C. Uniform Helper Strings and Application to the BSM With Errors
Keyed robust fuzzy extractors allow us to remove the need for an authenticated channel between the honest parties in the BSM with errors. As explained in Definition 7, the first step is to construct such extractors with uniform helper strings. We then show in more detail how they apply to the BSM.
Keyed robust extractors with uniform helper strings: Examining the keyed construction in Theorem 10, we see that the only place where the value depends on (the distribution of) is in the sketch . Indeed, the seed is chosen uniformly at random, and the value is close to uniform (even conditioned on , , , and ) by the properties of the extractor-MAC. Thus, to solve our problem, we only need to build an -secure sketch such that is statistically close to uniform whenever has sufficient min-entropy. (Note that such sketches cannot be deterministic.) Such sketches were studied by Dodis and Smith [17] , where they were used to solve the noisy-BSM problem even in the authenticated-channel case. In particular, Dodis and Smith show such sketches for the binary Hamming metric with parameters that are only a constant factor worse than those of regular sketches. The rest of the proof proceeds as in Theorem 10.
Application to the BSM:
To explain the application, we first briefly recall the key elements of the BSM [28] with errors [14] , [17] concentrating only on the stateless variant in [17] . Our discussion will be specific to Hamming distance.
In the BSM with errors, two parties (say, Alice and Bob) start by sharing a long-term secret key . At each time period , Alice (resp., Bob) has access to a noisy version (resp., ) of a random string (of length ). We assume a bound on the Hamming distance of and . Both the honest parties and the attacker are limited in storage to considerably fewer than bits. More specifically, we assume that can look at the entire but store only bits of (arbitrary) information about , for . After has stored its information about , it cannot see again; this means that has average minentropy from the adversary's point of view by Lemma 1. The honest parties are even more limited in their storage, but they can use their shared secret key to gain an advantage over the adversary and communicate securely without the need for computational assumptions (they can even achieve everlasting security [1] ).
Prior work [14] , [17] assumed that the communication channel between Alice and Bob was authenticated or, equivalently, that the adversary does not modify the messages between Alice and Bob. This authenticated channel was used to reconcile the differences between (the relevant portions of) and received by the two parties. In this study, we remove the need for the authenticated channel.
The basic idea underlying prior work is to use fuzzy extractors to derive a key from and that is unknown to . For example, in "sample-and-extract" protocols [39] , one part of consists of a key for an oblivious sampler [2] , [39] . This key specifies locations in the -bit string (resp., ) which Alice (resp., Bob) will read to obtain an -bit substring (resp., ). The properties of the sampler ensure that 1) with high probability and are still close (say, within Hamming distance from each other); and 2) with high probability, still has some uncertainty (min-entropy ) about and . (Note that it is crucial that does not know at the time is broadcast, so is unable to store information that is specifically correlated to .) Fuzzy extractors can then be used to derive from and , with Alice running to obtain and sending the helper string to Bob over the authenticated channel, and then Bob running to get [14] , [17] . To remove the need for an authenticated channel, Alice and Bob can use a robust fuzzy extractor instead. Because they are already in the shared-key setting, they can use a keyed robust fuzzy extractor, storing its secret key as part of their longterm secret key (in addition to ). There is, however, a subtle problem which already caused difficulties even in the case of authenticated channels and nonrobust extractors [14] , [17] .
The problem arises due to the reuse of . As discussed in Sections II-D and II-E, can be reused safely, but only if the input to the fuzzy extractor has sufficient min-entropy (from the adversary's point of view). In the current setting, however, a potential problem is that may use information gleaned from in order to reduce the entropy of . Specifically, if is correlated with , then may reveal information about the sampler key that was used to sample . In other words, by observing , may learn something about the locations in the large random string that were used to obtain . While it is too late for to observe those locations in (because of the bounded-storage assumption), may be able to observe the same locations in the next string , thus reducing the minentropy of , which will be obtained from those locations. We can solve this problem by making sure that reveals nothing about . This is precisely what is guaranteed by keyed robust fuzzy extractors with uniform helper strings, as constructed in Theorem 12, since is distributed the same way (up to a small statistical distance) regardless of what is. (To use Theorem 12, we need to ensure that the input to the extractor has sufficient min-entropy. This holds with overwhelming probability, even conditioned on and the knowledge of , because is unlikely to have stored much useful information about the locations sampled by .) Thus, using extractors with uniform helper strings ensures that the public value hides the entire , and not just , and therefore allows for the reuse of . Using such robust fuzzy extractors in place of nonrobust fuzzy extractors allows us to remove the need for authenticated channels in [17] ; the security argument (omitted here) is similar to the one there. Now, Alice and Bob no longer need to trust that their message goes unmodified: they will (with probability ) detect any modification to the helper string. The price is that Alice and Bob have to additionally share a (short) extractor-MAC key , compute the tag , and send this (short) tag together with the rest of the information. Thus, we obtain a stateless protocol in the BSM without assuming authenticated channels, which tolerates a linear fraction of Hamming errors, requires a long-term shared secret key of size , and requires Alice and Bob to read bits of the source, and to send a single message of size per time period in order to extract bits that are -close to uniform. These parameters are optimal up to constant factors.
APPENDIX POSTAPPLICATION ROBUSTNESS OF THE BASIC CONSTRUCTION
We argue that the construction from Section III-A cannot extract more than the stated number of bits if postapplication robustness is desired.
For postapplication robustness, the concern is that can reveal information to the adversary about for a cleverly chosen . Here, we show an adversarial strategy that does exactly this and succeeds in the postapplication robustness game with probability . In our attack, we fix a particular (and somewhat unusual) representation of field elements. (Recall that the theorem was claimed to work for any representation of field elements, so long as addition of field elements corresponds to the exclusive-or of bit strings.) Typically, one views as for some irreducible polynomial of degree , and represents elements as -valued vectors in the basis . We will do the same, but reorder the basis elements so as to separate the even and odd powers (assuming, for concreteness, that is even). Letting denote the field element corresponding to the polynomial , the property of this representation we use is that the bits of the left half of any value with last bit 0 are equal to the right half of the bits of . Recall . Suppose the distribution on is such that the top bits of are 0 (the rest of the bits of are uniform). Given and , the adversary gets to see the top bits of . Therefore, the adversary knows bits from the bottom half of as long as the last bit of is 0, which happens with probability . To use this knowledge, the adversary will simply ensure that the difference between and is , by letting . In detail, the adversarial strategy is as follows: let ; let consist of concatenated with the top bits of and random bits, and let . The adversary wins whenever , which happens with probability , because all but bits of are correct as long as the last bit of is 0.
